Bruker v. Marcovitz: Divorce and the Marriage of Law and Religion by Moon, Richard
The Supreme Court Law
Review: Osgoode’s Annual
Constitutional Cases
Conference
Volume 42 (2008) Article 3
Bruker v. Marcovitz: Divorce and the Marriage of
Law and Religion
Richard Moon
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Supreme
Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Moon, Richard. "Bruker v. Marcovitz: Divorce and the Marriage of Law and Religion." The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s
Annual Constitutional Cases Conference 42. (2008).
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol42/iss1/3
 Bruker v. Marcovitz: Divorce and the 
Marriage of Law and Religion 
Richard Moon* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At the time of their civil divorce, Mr. Marcovitz and Ms Bruker 
entered into an agreement concerning custody, access, division of 
property and support. Their agreement also included an undertaking by 
each to appear before the Beth Din (rabbinical court) for the purpose of 
obtaining a get, or divorce, under Jewish law.1 For their marriage to be 
dissolved under Jewish law, it was necessary for Mr. Marcovitz to 
provide, and Ms Bruker to accept, a “bill of divorce”, or get. Without a 
get neither party could remarry in the faith, and any subsequent intimate 
relationship entered into by either of them would be considered 
adulterous and any children born of that relationship would be viewed as 
illegitimate.  
Mr. Marcovitz did not appear before the Beth Din immediately 
following the civil divorce, as he had promised. Indeed, his consent to a 
religious divorce came 15 years later and then only after Ms Bruker had 
commenced an action for breach of contract.2 Once Mr. Marcovitz’s 
consent was given, and the couple were divorced under Jewish law, Ms 
Bruker amended her action to seek compensation for the loss she 
suffered as a consequence of his failure to give his consent at the time of 
the civil divorce.  
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1
 Clause 12 of their agreement provided as follows: “The parties [agree to] appear before 
the Rabbinical authorities in the City and District of Montreal for the purpose of obtaining the 
traditional religious Get, immediately upon a Decree Nisi of Divorce being granted.”  
Strictly speaking the get is not the divorce itself but the “bill of divorce” the husband presents 
to his wife in the presence of a rabbi and witnesses and that, when accepted by her, terminates their 
marriage. Because there is no additional requirement, involving the consent of a religious authority, 
the term get is often used to refer to the divorce itself.  
2
 Mr. Marcovitz may also have been “encouraged” to give a get by an application made by 
Ms Bruker under the Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.). See note 28 below. 
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The Quebec Superior Court found that Mr. Marcovitz’s undertaking 
was enforceable, despite its religious character.3 The judge held that the 
civil contract was justiciable and within the jurisdiction of the civil 
court, even though its object involved a religious matter. In his view: 
“The pith and essence of what is being asked for in this case is not 
religious” and that even though the case involved “Jewish parties and 
Jewish institutions”, the “principles of Jewish law do not have to be 
examined in depth”.4 Mr. Marcovitz had “a clear and unequivocal civil 
law obligation to appear ‘immediately’ before the Rabbinical 
authorities” which he breached.5 The judge awarded Ms Bruker $2,500 
for each of the 15 years during which she was unable to remarry, 
according to her faith.6 He also awarded her $10,000, on the ground that 
any children born to her during this period would have been illegitimate 
under Jewish law.7  
The Quebec Court of Appeal, however, reversed the decision of the 
trial judge and held “that the substance of the former husband’s obligation 
is religious in nature, irrespective of the form in which the obligation is 
stated, and accordingly, that an alleged breach of the obligation is not 
enforceable by the secular courts …”.8 In reaching this conclusion the 
Court said that its role was not “to palliate the discriminatory effect of 
the absence of a ghet on a Jewish woman who wants to obtain one …”.9 
A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, in a judgment written 
by Abella J.,10 reversed the decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal and 
held that Mr. Marcovitz’s promise was legally enforceable:  
The fact that [the promise] had religious elements does not thereby 
immunize it from judicial scrutiny. We are not dealing with judicial 
review of doctrinal religious principles, such as whether a particular 
get is valid. Nor are we required to speculate on what the rabbinical 
court would do. The promise by Mr. Marcovitz to remove the religious 
                                                                                                             
3 
 B. (S.B.) v. M. (J.B.), [2003] Q.J. No. 2896, [2003] R.J.Q. 1189 (Que. C.S.). 
4 
 Id., at para. 30. The agreement, said the judge, created “a valid civil obligation with 
religious undertones”. Id., at para. 20. 
5 
 Id., at para. 19. 
6 
 Id., at para. 49. 
7 
 Id., at para. 52. 
8
 Marcovitz v. Bruker, [2005] Q.J. No. 13563, 259 D.L.R. (4th) 55, at para. 76 (Que. 
C.A.). 
9 
 Id.  
10 
 Bruker v. Marcovitz, [2007] S.C.J. No. 54, 2007 SCC 54 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bruker”]. 
Chief Justice McLachlin, Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Fish and Rothstein JJ. concurring. 
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barriers to remarriage by providing a get was negotiated between two 
consenting adults, each represented by counsel, as part of a voluntary 
exchange of commitments intended to have legally enforceable 
consequences. This puts the obligation appropriately under a judicial 
microscope.11 
According to Abella J., a contract dealing with a religious matter is 
enforceable, provided its object is not prohibited by law or contrary to 
public order.12 Justice Abella was prepared to enforce Mr. Marcovitz’s 
undertaking because it was voluntarily made and because its interpretation 
did not require the court to consider contested religious doctrine. While 
conscious of the inaccessibility of religious reasons or doctrines to 
secular institutions, she accepted that religious agreements (or agreements 
dealing with religious matters) could not lie entirely outside law’s 
purview. A dissenting judgment written by Deschamps J.13 held that Mr. 
Marcovitz’s promise was not legally binding because it lacked a 
justiciable “object”, one of the essential elements of an enforceable 
agreement at civil law.14 According to Deschamps J., a contract with an 
exclusively religious object (or an object that could only be understood 
in religious terms) was not legally enforceable under the Quebec Civil 
Code.  
Justice Abella’s judgment, however, involved more (and perhaps 
less) than a determination that religious contracts are legally enforceable. 
She held that Mr. Marcovitz’s promise to consent was enforceable not 
simply (and perhaps not significantly) because it was a voluntary 
obligation but because public policy supported the removal of barriers to 
religious divorce and remarriage. The enforcement of Mr. Marcovitz’s 
promise, she said, was supported by a public policy favouring the 
removal of such barriers, and, more generally, by a public commitment 
to gender equality and freedom of choice in marriage. While Abella J. 
was prepared to enforce a husband’s promise to consent, there is more 
than a suggestion in her judgment that a return promise by his wife, and 
in particular a promise related to custody, support or the division of 
property, might not be enforced — and that a husband may not use his 
consent power as a bargaining lever to obtain or “extort” concessions 
                                                                                                             
11 
 Id., at para. 47. 
12
  Id., at paras. 48-64. 
13 
 Justice Charron joined in the dissent. 
14 
 Bruker, supra, note 10, at para. 174. 
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from his spouse. Underlying her judgment is a desire to mitigate the 
harshness of the divorce rules of the Jewish community and a belief that 
religious community members may sometimes require legal protection 
from the rules and practices of their community. 
II. THE LEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF RELIGIOUS CONTRACTS 
The majority judgment of Abella J. addressed two questions: first, 
whether Mr. Marcovitz’s promise to consent to a religious divorce was a 
binding contractual obligation under Quebec law; and second, if the 
promise was legally binding, “whether the husband can rely on freedom 
of religion [under the Quebec Charter of human rights and freedoms] to 
avoid the legal consequences of failing to comply with a lawful 
agreement”.15 
In response to the first question, of whether the contract was 
enforceable under the Civil Code, Abella J. found that Mr. Marcovitz’s 
promise to consent to a religious divorce was legally enforceable and 
that Ms Bruker was entitled to damages for the loss she suffered as a 
consequence of her husband’s failure to do as he had promised. A 
contract could have a religious object, provided that object was not 
“prohibited by law” or “contrary to public order”.16 According to Abella 
J. “an agreement between spouses to take the necessary steps to permit 
each other to remarry in accordance with their own religions, constitutes 
a valid and binding contractual obligation under Quebec law”.17 
Justice Deschamps, in her dissenting judgment, agreed that a legally 
binding contract may be motivated by religious interests or may deal 
with religious concerns, if “it meets all the requirements for a civil 
contract under provincial legislation”.18 She noted that under the Quebec 
                                                                                                             
15 
 Id., at para. 14. 
16 
 Id., at para. 59. 
17 
 Id., at para. 16. Justice Abella added:  
It will obviously depend in each case on the nature of the undertaking and, in particular, 
on the extent to which the promise is consistent with our laws, policies, and democratic 
values. An agreement to resolve a custody dispute in a way that offends a child’s best 
interests, or an agreement that violates our employment laws, for example, will likely be 
found to be contrary to public order. 
Id., at para. 62. 
18 
 Id., at para. 123. Justice Deschamps stated that a court is 
not barred from considering a question of a religious nature, provided that the claim is 
based on the violation of a rule recognized in positive law… . The requirement that there 
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Civil Code an obligation will be enforceable provided the parties are 
legally capable of contracting, their consent is legally given, the contract 
has an object and there is lawful cause or consideration. Justice 
Deschamps found that Mr. Marcovitz’s promise to consent to a religious 
divorce satisfied all but one of these requirements. In her view, the 
undertaking lacked a justiciable object — an object that was “capable of 
legal characterization”.19 Because a religious divorce has no civil 
consequences, it is not “an operation recognized in civil law” and the 
promise to consent to such a divorce is not legally enforceable.20 While 
an enforceable agreement may be motivated by religious concerns or 
values, its object must involve actions or consequences that can be 
understood in legal or secular terms — it must have civil significance or 
secular meaning. 
There are several reasons why the courts may hesitate or refuse to 
enforce agreements that are based on religious norms or deal with 
religious matters. First, the interpretation of such an agreement may 
draw the courts into disputes about the proper understanding of religious 
doctrine or practice. Second, legal enforcement may be inappropriate 
given the subject matter of the agreement (matters of faith or deep 
commitment) and the relationship between the parties (members of a 
community bound by a shared commitment to a set of values/practices or 
to a way of life). Third, agreements between religious community 
members may be tainted by undue influence or unfair pressure.  
When enforcing a contract that is based on a religious norm, the 
court may be drawn into disputes about the proper meaning of the norm 
and have no secular or “objective” standard upon which to base its 
                                                                                                             
be a rule of positive law before an action will lie is a neutral basis for distinguishing 
cases in which intervention is appropriate from cases in which it is not. 
Id., at para. 122. 
19 
 Id., at para. 174. Justice Deschamps observed that under the Civil Code: “the object of a 
contract is the juridical operation envisaged by the parties at the time of its formation” (emphasis 
added). Id., at para. 170.  
The fact that the cause of a contract is connected with a religion does not affect the 
validity of the contract. For example, a person may have various reasons for undertaking 
to pay his or her religious community a specific sum of money, the most basic being a 
desire to contribute to an institution’s financial health. In this sense, it is correct to say 
that a contract with a religious cause may be valid. There is nothing unlawful about 
having a religious reason for entering into a contract. However, the cause of the contract 
must not be confused with its object … 
Id., at para. 169. 
20 
 Id., at para. 174. 
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interpretation. The court may be forced into the role of “arbiter of 
religious doctrine”.21 Justice Deschamps thought that the public 
commitment to multiculturalism, freedom of conscience and religion, 
and the right to equality, required that the courts “remain neutral where 
religious precepts are concerned” and avoid any entanglement with 
religion.22 This neutrality is necessary if the courts are “to play their role 
as arbiters in relation to the cohabitation of different religions” and “to 
decide how to reconcile conflicting rights”.23 
Yet when interpreting commercial and other contractual arrangements, 
the courts are often required to consider the customs and norms of 
different sub-groups within the larger community. The contracting 
parties may have relied on such norms or customs even though they may 
have (slightly) different views about their meaning and implications. 
Why then is it unacceptable for the courts to enforce a contract when the 
norms underlying it (and subject to contest) are religious? The problem, 
I think, is that religious norms, particularly when they are in dispute, 
cannot be viewed as simply social conventions — to be determined by 
an examination of group practice. They are, for the adherent, part of a 
higher law, and must be respected because they are true or because they 
are God-given. Any dispute between the contracting parties about the 
proper understanding of these norms is a dispute about spiritual truth. 
The resolution of such a dispute involves a judgment not about the best 
interpretation of a social practice but about the proper reading of divine 
law — about what God has truly commanded. The democratic/secular 
state, though, is expected to remove itself from such issues — and avoid 
making determinations about spiritual truth.  
                                                                                                             
21 
 In deciding that Mr. Marcovitz’s undertaking was not legally enforceable, the Quebec 
Court of Appeal relied in part on the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Syndicat 
Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] S.C.J. No. 46, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Amselem”] 
which held that the state should not be “the arbiter of religious dogma”. As Iacobucci J. put it: “In 
my view, the State is in no position to be, nor should it become, the arbiter of religious dogma. 
Accordingly, courts should avoid judicially interpreting and thus determining, either explicitly or 
implicitly, the content of a subjective understanding of a religious requirement … . ” Id., at para. 50. 
The issue has been significant in the U.S., where it has been held that the “establishment 
clause” of the First Amendment prohibits government actors from becoming “entangled” with 
religion. The court must interpret a religious contract according to “neutral” or secular principles. A 
contractual dispute should not be considered by the courts if it cannot be resolved exclusively on the 
basis of such principles. See, for example, Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. 1983).  
22 
 Bruker, supra, note 10, at para. 102. 
23 
 Id. 
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Justice Deschamps’ requirement that a legally enforceable contract 
have an object that is “capable of legal characterization” may ensure that 
the courts have a non-religious standard upon which to draw when 
interpreting an agreement.24 Yet, even if its object can be framed in 
secular terms, a contract dealing with a religious matter (such as an 
agreement to pay mahr or to hold property collectively as a member of a 
Hutterite community) cannot be interpreted without reference to the 
norms or practices of the religious community, which may be subject to 
contest. Any attempt by the courts to avoid religious doctrine and rely on 
“neutral” principles, when interpreting such an agreement, will either 
ignore or distort the parties’ actual intention — their contractual purpose.  
The distinction drawn by Deschamps J., between a contract with a 
religious object that cannot be characterized in legal terms and is not 
enforceable, and a contract that despite its religious motivation can be 
understood in legal or secular terms, and is enforceable, resembles the 
distinction that is sometimes made, in debates about religious values in 
public decision-making, between, on the one hand, purely religious 
reasons and, on the other, (religious) reasons or concerns that can be 
framed in secular terms. The familiar argument is that because religious 
values or beliefs are inaccessible to non-believers, they lie outside the 
scope of reasonable public debate and cannot provide a publicly 
acceptable basis for law-making. Public action then must be based on 
non-religious values and concerns, or, at least, it must be possible for a 
public decision-maker to defend his/her decisions or actions on non-
religious grounds, even if her/his motives are religiously based. Public 
decision-making about the rules of collective life is separated from 
personal commitment to spiritual truth by the requirement that the 
former be framed in non-religious terms. But the distinction may be 
more apparent than real. While a religious adherent may be able to 
describe her/his values/interests to others in non-religious terms, her/his 
understanding of, and commitment to, these values/interests rest on their 
                                                                                                             
24 
 It is possible, though, that Deschamps J.’s purpose was more limited. While she accepted 
that it may be necessary for the courts to interpret/enforce some religious contracts, she may have 
thought that the courts should decline to enforce those contracts that lack any (other) civil 
significance. The issue of whether a particular piece of property does or does not belong to a 
particular individual or entity is not just something that secular actors can comprehend, it is 
something that, in the civil sphere, requires an answer — even if the answer the courts give is to 
defer to the decision of a religious authority. But civil institutions need have no interest in the status 
of a particular individual within his/her religious community — as divorced or married, for 
example. 
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religious foundation. For the religious adherent, this foundation is part of 
the justification or basis for the public action or, in this context, the 
contract. More importantly, the religious foundation of the public action 
(or the private contract) which gives it meaning and force for the 
adherent, also shapes its content. 
Justice Abella adopted a more pragmatic approach to the issue. In 
her view, the religious character of Mr. Marcovitz’s undertaking did not 
“immunize it from judicial scrutiny”.25 The court may take jurisdiction 
so long as the dispute concerns the legal rights of the parties.26 In this 
case, said Abella J., “[w]e are not dealing with judicial review of 
doctrinal religious principles, such as whether a particular get is valid. 
Nor are we required to speculate on what the rabbinical court would 
do.”27 The difficulty though is that the resolution of the legal 
(contractual) issue may depend on religious doctrine — on the proper 
understanding of a religious principle or practice. In Lakeside Colony of 
Hutterian Brethren v. Hofer28 (a case cited by Abella J.), Gonthier J. for 
the majority, was aware of the entanglement issue but did not seem 
troubled by it. He noted that “while the courts may not intervene in 
strictly doctrinal or spiritual matters, they will when civil or property 
rights are engaged”.29 “Once the court takes jurisdiction over a dispute 
with religious components”, said Gonthier J., “it must try ‘to come to the 
best understanding possible of the applicable tradition and custom’.”30 
The court, in that case and in this, does not attempt the impossible task 
of isolating religious concerns and interests from secular law. 
Justice Abella seemed to assume that in this case the contract could 
be enforced without the court having to delve into religious doctrine. She 
thought that Mr. Marcovitz’s promise was clear and unambiguous. She 
noted that he offered no religious reasons for his failure to perform his 
undertaking and that, in any event, Judaism recognized no reasons to 
                                                                                                             
25 
 Id., at para. 47. 
26 
 As Abella J. put it: “I do not see the religious aspect of the obligation in Paragraph 12 of 
the Consent as a barrier to its civil validity. It is true that a party cannot be compelled to execute a 
moral duty, but there is nothing in the Civil Code preventing someone from transforming his or her 
moral obligations into legally valid and binding ones.” Id., at para. 51. 
27 
 Id., at para. 47. Furthermore, wrote Abella J., “[t]he fact that a dispute has a religious 
aspect does not by itself make it non-justiciable.” Id., at para. 41. 
28 
 [1992] S.C.J. No. 87, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 165 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lakeside Colony”]. 
29 
 Bruker, supra, note 10, at para. 45. 
30 
 Id. See also Lakeside Colony, supra, note 28, at 191. 
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refuse consent.31 Yet Abella J. could make this determination only after 
considering the rules and practices of the religious community. The 
obvious question is whether she approached this task as a secular public 
actor seeking to identify the social practices of a religious community or 
as a member of that community and a participant in the debates about the 
proper understanding of its rules. It seems likely that her knowledge of 
Jewish law and practice gave her some comfort in deciding that the 
religious law was clear on this issue. We are left to wonder, however, 
what she might have done had there been some dispute (or had she 
recognized there was some dispute) within the Jewish community about 
whether a husband was ever justified in withholding his consent.32 
Another reason for judicial reluctance to enforce religious contracts 
is that both the subject matter of the contract and the relationship 
between the contracting parties may make legal enforcement 
inappropriate. A religious contract is based on norms that are often faith-
based and deeply held and that bind the members of the religious 
community. When entering an agreement or “contract” the parties may 
not understand themselves as creating legal obligations. They may 
consider themselves bound not by secular law but by the spiritual norms 
of their community — by higher law — and by their commitment to 
each other as members of a spiritual community.33 And to this we might 
                                                                                                             
31 
 As Abella J. put it in Bruker, supra, note 10, at paras. 68-69:  
… It is not clear to me what aspect of his religious beliefs prevented him from providing 
a get. He never, in fact, offered a religious reason for refusing to provide a get. Rather, 
he said that his refusal was based on the fact that, in his words:  
Mrs. Bruker harassed me, she alienated my kids from me, she stole some 
money from me, she stole some silverware from my mother, she prevented 
my proper visitation with the kids. Those are the reasons …  
This concession confirms, in my view, that his refusal to provide the get was based less 
on religious conviction than on the fact that he was angry at Ms. Bruker. His religion 
does not require him to refuse to give Ms. Bruker a get. The contrary is true. There is no 
doubt that at Jewish law he could refuse to give one, but that is very different from Mr. 
Marcovitz being prevented by a tenet of his religious beliefs from complying with a legal 
obligation he voluntarily entered into and of which he took the negotiated benefits. 
32 
 Justice Abella’s appeal to Jewish practice to dismiss Mr. Marcovitz’s assertion that he 
had religious reasons for his refusal to give his wife a get seemed to ignore the Court’s 
determination in Amselem (supra, note 21) that an individual’s sincerely held spiritual beliefs are 
protected whether or not they are part of an established belief system.  
33
 The courts may decline to enforce such an agreement for the same reasons they have 
sometimes declined to enforce a “family bargain” — because the agreement is embedded in larger 
relationships and is inseparable from deeper obligations. The reluctance to enforce family bargains, 
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add, that the legal enforcement of such an agreement or undertaking (or 
the threat of legal enforcement) may undermine the deeper spiritual 
connections between community members.34 Even when religious parties 
explicitly engage private law forms — and may reasonably be 
understood as creating legal rights and obligations — they may believe 
that it would be wrong, a breach of their faith and their commitment to 
their community, to resort to the courts when disputes arise about the 
meaning or implementation of the agreement.35 
Finally, the courts may be reluctant to enforce a religious contract 
because they are concerned that one (or both) of the parties has not made 
a free and independent decision to enter into the agreement. The parties 
to a religious contract may be connected by a common history and a 
shared commitment to a set of faith-based norms and practices. They 
may be materially and psychologically tied to their spiritual community. 
In this context, pressure to agree may be applied by family and friends.36 
This pressure may be explicit and involve demands and threats, or it may 
be more subtle. Even in the absence of external pressure, the individual 
may feel pushed to meet the expectations of family and community. The 
individual may be expected, as a matter of loyalty to his/her religious 
community, to agree, and adhere, to norms that are part of the higher law 
that binds the members of the community, or are part of what constitutes 
the community’s identity.37 She/he may feel “compelled” to agree to 
                                                                                                             
and religious bargains, may also rest on a recognition that legal intervention will damage the deeper 
relationship between family members or religious adherents. 
34
 Moreover, the particular norm or practice that is the subject of the contract may be 
embedded within (and understandable in relation to) a larger system of religious norms and 
practices. For example, the promise to pay deferred mahr in a Muslim marriage contract is tied to 
the husband’s power to divorce his wife unilaterally. For a discussion of this see Pascale Fournier, 
“In the (Canadian) Shadow of Islamic Law: Translating Mahr as a Bargaining Endowment” in  
R. Moon, ed., Law and Religious Pluralism in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008).  
35
 For a discussion of the Hutterite prohibition on resort to secular courts, see Alvin Esau, 
The Courts and the Colonies: The Litigation of Hutterite Church Disputes (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
2004). Another example may be the ill-fated proposal to establish Sharia arbitration tribunals in 
Ontario under the provincial arbitration legislation. The proponents thought it symbolically 
important for the tribunal’s decisions to have legal force. Yet it appears they did not think that 
disputes between the parties concerning implementation of the arbitration decision should be taken 
to the secular courts.  
36 
 Lindsey E. Blenkhorn, “Islamic Marriage Contracts and American Courts: Interpreting 
Mahr Agreements as Prenuptials and Their Effect on Muslim Women” (2002-2003) 76 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 189 notes that in the case of an agreement to pay Mahr “the bride herself has little or no 
involvement in the negotiation …”. 
37 
 Some proponents of Sharia arbitration in the recent debate in Ontario declared that one is 
not a good Muslim if one does not agree to submit one’s dispute to arbitration based on Sharia law. 
(2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) BRUKER V. MARCOVITZ 47 
 
contractual terms that are presented as morally binding, or as elements of 
community membership.38 Because individuals are deeply tied to their 
religious communities, they may feel significant pressure to submit to 
the rules or expectations of their community. The members of some 
insular communities may have difficulty even imagining other rules or 
practices.  
However, we should not confuse the inner pressure an individual 
may feel to live up to certain values or obligations with the various 
forms of external pressure or restriction that may lead her/him to adopt 
particular practices or norms (or even with the limited scope of choice 
that may occur when she/he is not exposed to other ways of thinking). 
Each of us is affected by an array of deeply held values, commitments 
and associations. We should not be too quick to regard those who hold 
views with which we disagree or who live in more insular communities 
as lacking agency. A general decision by the courts not to enforce 
religious contracts, might unfairly deny religious individuals the power 
to make binding legal arrangements based on their values, practices and 
interests. More practically, a general exclusion would require the courts 
to distinguish religious from non-religious agreements. Given the subtle 
and significant ways in which religious belief shapes individual action, 
the line between these might be very difficult to draw.  
Justice Abella thought that instead of refusing to enforce all religious 
contracts, the courts should address concerns about undue influence or 
contractual intention on a case-by-case basis. The courts should decline 
to enforce a particular contract when there is genuine dispute about the 
relevant religious values or practices, or when there is real concern that 
the consent of the parties was not given voluntarily. This approach 
seems both reasonable and necessary. The problem, though, is that every 
time a religious contract is contested the courts will be drawn to some 
extent into the interpretation of religious practice or doctrine. Similarly, 
every religious contract is made between parties who share a 
commitment to a set of deep values and traditions. The courts may be 
more inclined to decide that a contract cannot be interpreted in a neutral 
                                                                                                             
For a discussion of this see Lorraine E. Weinrib, “Ontario’s Sharia Law Debate: Law and Politics 
under the Charter” in R. Moon, ed., Law and Religious Pluralism in Canada (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2008). 
38 
 Ironically, in this case, we might wonder whether Mr. Marcovitz’s promise was 
“voluntary” since men who refuse their consent are often subjected to significant criticism within 
the religious community.  
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way (or in a way that does not draw the court into the interpretation of 
religious norms) or was entered without proper consent by one or both of 
the parties, when it is based on religious values or practices that differ 
significantly from those of the mainstream community.  
III. THE STATE’S ROLE IN REMEDYING RELIGION 
The majority judgment of Justice Abella formally held that a 
contract dealing with a religious matter is legally enforceable. Her 
judgment, however, said both more and less than this. 
Justice Abella declared that the enforcement of Mr. Marcovitz’s 
promise “harmonizes with Canada’s approach to religious freedom, to 
equality rights, to divorce and remarriage generally …”.39 She saw Mr. 
Marcovitz’s refusal to consent as a particular instance of a much larger 
problem in the Jewish community: the problem of “recalcitrant” 
husbands who refuse to provide a get, thus precluding their wives from 
remarrying within the religious community and leaving them in a 
position of poverty and dependence.40 Canadians, said Abella J., should 
have the right “to decide for themselves whether their marriage has 
irretrievably broken down”.41 In Canada civil marriage and divorce are 
available “equally to men and women”; but a get, observed Abella J. 
“can only be given under Jewish law by a husband”: “It is true”, she 
acknowledged, that a get also requires the consent of the wife, but … the 
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 Bruker, supra, note 10, at para. 63. According to Abella J., the enforcement of such a 
promise was “consistent with public policy, our approach to marriage and divorce, and our 
commitment to eradicating gender discrimination”. Id., at para. 16. 
40 
 The dissent did not connect this case to any larger issue of gender inequality or religious 
oppression. Indeed, Deschamps J. frequently observed that a religious divorce requires mutual 
consent, and that the wife no less than the husband has the power to prevent a divorce. She also 
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“many deviations from the doctrines and precepts of the Orthodox Jewish Community — her 
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judge). Justice Deschamps also referred to Ms Bruker’s difficult personality, noting that “[h]er 
relationship with her daughters was as difficult as her relationship with the respondent.” Id., at para. 
109. 
41 
 Id., at para. 82. Justice Abella referred to “[t]he public interest in protecting equality 
rights, the dignity of Jewish women in their independent ability to divorce and remarry … ”. Id., at 
para. 92. Justice Abella observed that “[f]or those Jewish women whose religious principles prevent 
them from considering remarriage unless they are able to do so in accordance with Jewish law, the 
denial of a get is the denial of the right to remarry.” Id., at para. 82. 
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law has a disparate impact on women …”.42 In her view, “[t]he refusal of 
a husband to provide a get, therefore, arbitrarily denies his wife access to 
a remedy she independently has under Canadian law and denies her the 
ability to remarry and get on with her life in accordance with her 
religious beliefs”.43 
Mr. Marcovitz was obligated to give his consent to a religious 
divorce, not just because he had promised to, but because public policy 
supported the removal of barriers to religious remarriage. Justice Abella 
thought that the courts should “attempt to facilitate, rather than impede, 
[Canadians’] ability to continue their lives, including with new 
families”.44 She stated that “[f]or many years, civil courts have attempted 
to remedy, or compensate for, the husband’s recalcitrance in refusing to 
provide a get to his wife”.45 According to Abella J. this policy lay behind 
the 1990 amendment to the Divorce Act which empowers a judge in a 
civil divorce case to exert pressure on a spouse, who refuses to give 
his/her consent to a religious divorce, by “dismissing any application by 
that spouse” and “strik[ing] out any other pleadings and affidavits filed 
by the spouse”.46 As described by Abella J.: “Section 21.1 of the Divorce 
Act … gives a court discretionary authority to rebuff a spouse in civil 
proceedings who obstructs religious remarriage …”47. It is she said “a 
clear indication that it is public policy in this country that such barriers 
are to be discouraged”.48 
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 For this point she cites Ayelet Schachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural 
Differences and Women’s Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), at 62: “The 
family law realm … vividly illustrates the troubling paradox of multicultural vulnerability, by 
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noted by Kent Greenawalt, “Religious Law and Civil Law: Using Secular Law to Assure 
Observance of Practices with Religious Significance” (1998) 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 781, at 811 the 
negative consequences of entering a new relationship without a religious divorce are far more 
significant for a woman than for a man. 
43 
 Bruker, [2007] S.C.J. No. 54, 2007 SCC 54, at para. 82 (S.C.C.).  
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 Id. 
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 Id., at para. 9. 
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 Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), s. 21.1(3). In Abella J.’s view, by passing the 
1990 amendments, “Parliament manifested a clear intention to encourage the removal of religious 
barriers to remarriage.” Bruker, supra, note 43, at para. 63. See also the Ontario Family Law Act, 
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Culture in Canadian Family Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1992) [hereinafter “Syrtash”] and the 
review of Syrtash’s book by Shauna Van Praagh in (1993) 38 McGill 233 [hereinafter “Van 
Praagh”]. 
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 Bruker, supra, note 43, at para. 81. 
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 Id. 
50 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
While Abella J. was eager to enforce a promise to give a get, it is not 
clear that she would have been willing to enforce a return promise 
dealing with support or custody. In her judgment Abella J. quoted Kim 
Campbell, Justice Minister at the time of the Divorce Act amendment, 
who used the term “blackmail” to describe a husband’s use of the 
consent power as a bargaining lever.49 Yet if a religious matter may be 
the subject of a legally enforceable contract, why is it “extortion” or 
“blackmail” for a husband to use his power of consent — his religious 
prerogative — to “extract” concessions from his wife? The term 
blackmail or extortion is applicable only if, from a public perspective, it 
is wrong for a husband to withhold his consent or to threaten to do so for 
personal gain.50 The refusal to enforce a return promise would appear to 
rest on a judgment that the divorce rules/practices of Judaism are unjust 
or oppressive and that the law should seek to mitigate their impact.51 
The promise to consent then was enforced by the Court not simply 
because Mr. Marcovitz gave an undertaking but also, and perhaps 
significantly, because public policy supports the removal of religious 
barriers to remarriage — including the barrier of a husband’s consent 
prerogative. The husband’s voluntary undertaking provides an opening 
or opportunity for the court to advance this public policy (to protect the 
interests of the wife) without having to intervene more directly into the 
affairs of the religious community.52  
Justice Abella argued that Mr. Marcovitz’s religious freedom was 
not breached by the Court’s enforcement of his promise because his 
religion “does not require him to refuse to give Ms Bruker a get”: “There 
is no doubt that at Jewish law he could refuse to give one, but that is 
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 Id., at para. 8. See also the Ontario Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, s. 56(5): “The 
court may, on application, set aside all or part of a separation agreement or settlement, if the court is 
satisfied that the removal by one spouse of barriers that would prevent the other spouse’s remarriage 
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 Or stated in another way — it is wrong only if the wife is put in an unfair choice 
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51 
 Syrtash, supra, note 46, at 126 states that if a court were to set aside an undertaking 
(under s. 56(5) of the Ontario Family Law Act) on the grounds that it was given in return for a 
promise to give a get, the get might not be considered valid by rabbinical authorities. This suggests, 
among other things, that within Jewish law the promise to give a get may be used as a bargaining 
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52 
 I note that Abella J. cited without reservation legislative measures in other jurisdictions 
that directly intervene to compel a husband to appear before the Rabbinical Court to give his 
consent. Specifically, she refers to cases in New York and Israel in which the state compelled a 
husband to consent to a religious divorce even when there was no promise made by him. Bruker, 
supra, note 43, at paras. 88-89. 
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very different from Mr. Marcovitz being prevented by a tenet of his 
religious beliefs from complying with a legal obligation he voluntarily 
entered into and of which he took the negotiated benefits.”53 Because the 
divorce agreement is not a religious act, enforcement of his promise (and 
perhaps also a direct legal order) to consent does not breach his freedom 
of religion — it does not compel or pressure him to act in a way that is 
inconsistent with his religious beliefs.54  
Not far in the background of Abella J.’s judgment is the issue of the 
constitutionality of section 21.1 of the Divorce Act, an issue that was 
specifically not pursued in the courts by Mr. Marcovitz. Nevertheless, 
Abella J. drew from this legislative provision a public policy supporting 
the removal of barriers to remarriage.55 While she insisted that nothing in 
her reasons “purports in any way to decide the constitutionality of s. 
21.1”,56 her finding that Mr. Marcovitz’s freedom of religion was not 
breached by the enforcement of his promise, would seem to apply 
equally to this provision of the Divorce Act.  
Yet even if the court does not require the husband to take action that 
is inconsistent with his religious beliefs and practices, the public policy 
on which the court relies (and the selective enforcement of religious 
undertakings — including the one-sided enforcement of agreements to 
give a get) “supports” the exercise of his “discretion” to give a get. The 
Divorce Act goes further and interferes with the exercise of the 
husband’s prerogative under Jewish law. It removes or constrains a right 
that religious law grants to him. Moreover, the harm to which the court 
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 Id., at para. 69. Justice Abella insisted that “[t]his is not, as implied by the dissent, an 
unwarranted secular trespass into religious fields, nor does it amount to judicial sanction of the 
vagaries of an individual’s religion.” Id., at para. 18. 
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 As Abella J. elaborated: “The test applied by the majority in Amselem examines whether 
an individual’s sincerely held and good faith religious belief is being unjustifiably limited to a non-
trivial degree. Applying this test to the facts of this case, I see no prima facie infringement of Mr. 
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overcome the assertion that the court is interfering indirectly with a practice associated with 
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 There was some debate between the majority and dissenting judgments about the 
appropriateness of this reliance on s. 21.1. Mr. Marcovitz had agreed not to pursue a constitutional 
challenge to the Divorce Act provision. The agreement provided that Mr. Marcovitz “may argue the 
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is responding, when it pressures the husband to give a get, relates to the 
status of his wife within the religious community.  
Justice Abella saw the wrong against Ms Bruker as stemming simply 
from Mr. Marcovitz’s decision to withhold, or threaten to withhold, his 
consent. This prerogative, however, is granted to him by the religious 
rules of his community. Justice Abella may be right in her reading of 
Jewish law, that there are no reasons that justify a husband withholding 
his consent.57 The religious divorce rules nevertheless provide that the 
marriage will be dissolved only when the husband has given his consent 
voluntarily. As Abella J. observed, the husband has “absolute discretion, 
to divorce” his wife.58 This may explain why the state has applied only 
indirect pressure on recalcitrant husbands. A rabbinical court might not 
regard a husband’s consent as voluntary, if it has been given in response 
to a direct order by a court.59 The injustice to which the court is 
responding stems from the religious community’s divorce rules and 
more generally from the ordinary actions and perceptions of the 
community’s members. These are matters that a court cannot simply 
control or fix.  
However, it may be an oversimplification of Jewish divorce law to 
say that the husband has absolute discretion to give a get. In the past the 
Jewish community employed a variety of methods to pressure a husband 
to give a get. Patrick Glenn notes that a “rabbinically compelled gett was 
clearly recognized as valid and effective in Jewish law”.60 For a variety 
of reasons, however, these methods are no longer available or practical. 
This is why some in the Jewish community asked the state to step in and 
apply pressure on recalcitrant husbands. The fact that many in the Jewish 
community do not consider that community pressure vitiates the 
husband’s consent suggests that the requirement that his consent be 
“voluntary” may be more a matter of form or appearance than substance.  
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 Justice Abella expressed doubts about the sincerity of Mr. Marcovitz’s religious 
objection to providing a get: “I start by querying whether Mr. Marcovitz, in good faith, sincerely 
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 H. Patrick Glenn, “Where Heavens Meet: The Compelling of Religious Divorces” (1980) 
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In support of her argument that the enforcement of Mr. Marcovitz’s 
promise (and the policy promoting the removal of barriers to religious 
remarriage) did not breach his freedom of religion, Abella J. pointed to 
the support within the Jewish community (or at least from leading 
Jewish organizations) for the amendment to the Divorce Act, and more 
generally for the imposition of secular/legal pressure on husbands to 
give their consent. She noted that within the Jewish community there 
was “a consensus that the refusal to provide a get was an unwarranted 
indignity imposed on Jewish women and, to the extent possible, one that 
should not be countenanced by Canada’s legal system”.61 Her 
assumption seemed to be that because section 21.1 was added to the Act 
as a result of lobbying by the Jewish community, it should not be 
regarded as an interference with the religious practices of the 
community, and indeed might even be viewed as an accommodation of 
the religious community — as a response to the community’s needs and 
interests.  
If the religious authorities in the community do not think that 
indirect state pressure on a recalcitrant husband nullifies his consent, 
then perhaps such pressure should not be viewed as interference with the 
community’s religious practices. Yet it is not so clear that there is 
consensus in the Jewish community concerning the acceptability of state 
intervention. Moreover, as the majority recognizes, in its current form 
Jewish law provides that a couple is divorced only when both the 
husband and wife give their consent. The Jewish community, despite its 
concerns about the fairness of this rule (of the unrestricted power to 
consent) is either unwilling or unable to change it. The fact that many in 
the Jewish community regard this rule as unfair in its application, and 
have asked the public authorities to intervene (specifically to pressure 
husbands to give their consent) does not change the fact that the state is 
involved in fixing or limiting a religious rule that is viewed as unfair 
from the public perspective.  
According to Abella J., Mr. Marcovitz’s refusal to consent 
“represented an unjustified and severe impairment of [Ms Bruker’s] 
ability to live her life in accordance with this country’s values and her 
Jewish beliefs”.62 The paradoxical assertion here is that Mr. Marcovitz’s 
refusal to consent, based on Jewish law, is preventing his wife “from 
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living her life as a Jewish woman”. However, it is Jewish divorce law 
(and Ms Bruker’s commitment to her faith or her faith community) and 
not simply Mr. Marcovitz’s decision that is preventing her from living a 
full and equal life, as understood by the broader community. The 
husband’s refusal to consent does not, as Abella J. claimed, deny his 
wife “the right to remarry” or deny her “access to a remedy she 
independently has under Canadian law”.63 Instead, it denies her “the 
ability to remarry … in accordance with her religious beliefs”.64 The 
denial of consent constrains her only because she is committed to her 
faith — and its rules — or because membership in the community 
matters deeply to her. The denial of a religious divorce affects only her 
religious status or her status within the community of believers. (Again 
this is why state intervention will not be effective, if the community 
discounts his consent as involuntary and continues to regard his wife as 
married.) As the dissent pointed out, only Ms Bruker’s religious rights 
are in issue, and only as a result of religious rules: “It was a rule of her 
religion that prevented her from” divorcing and remarrying.65 
The issue that Abella J. does not address explicitly is when, if ever, 
the state should intervene in the affairs of a religious community to 
protect individual members from unfair or oppressive internal rules. Any 
argument in support of intervention must rest on a recognition that 
religious belief is deeply rooted, a matter of identity, and that a religious 
community is not simply a voluntary association from which an 
individual may easily exit when she/he disagrees with some of its rules. 
It must rest on a belief that the individual should not be required to 
choose between exit from a community to which she/he is deeply 
attached and membership subject to unfair rules. Justice Abella, in 
support of intervention, noted that Dickson C.J.C. in R. v. Big M Drug 
Mart Ltd.66 had “confirmed that religious freedoms were nonetheless 
subject to limitations when they disproportionately collided with other 
significant public rights and interests”.67 But the purpose of legal 
intervention in the Bruker case was to free religious individuals from the 
impact of the rules of their religious community — a community with 
which they identify and continue to associate. 
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IV. AN ASIDE ON WAIVER OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION 
As noted in the previous section, Abella J. did not think that the 
enforcement of Mr. Marcovitz’s promise breached his freedom of 
religion (under the Quebec Charter of human rights and freedoms), 
because his religion did not preclude him from consenting to a religious 
divorce. Justice Abella, however, went on to argue that even if the 
enforcement of Mr. Marcovitz’s promise amounted to a restriction on his 
freedom of religion, this restriction was justified under section 9.1 of the 
Quebec Charter.68 She found that the “public interest in protecting 
equality rights, the dignity of Jewish women in their independent ability 
to divorce and remarry, as well as the public benefit in enforcing valid 
and binding contractual obligations … outweigh[ed] Mr. Marcovitz’s 
claim that enforcing Paragraph 12 of the Consent would interfere with 
his religious freedom”.69 But does holding him to a promise he made, 
even if that promise required him to act in a way that is inconsistent with 
his religious beliefs, amount to an interference with his religious 
freedom that must be justified by the state? 
The Quebec Court of Appeal thought that Mr. Marcovitz could not 
be understood to have waived his freedom of religion right. Justice 
Hilton of the Court of Appeal, referring to the Supreme Court of Canada 
decision in Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem,70 said that:  
If an observant Jewish man could not be presumed to have 
contractually waived his freedom of religion and thus be entitled to 
erect a succah on his balcony, how can Mr. Marcovitz be presumed to 
have waived his right not to appear before a rabbinical tribunal for the 
granting of a ghet as a matter of religious conscience, and who is this 
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Court to tell him that he had a civil duty to perform irrespective of the 
rights he might have according to his religious beliefs?71 
In Amselem, Iacobucci J., for the majority of the Supreme Court, rejected 
the condominium association’s argument that the appellant had waived 
his freedom of religion right to erect a succah on the balcony of his 
condominium unit. At the time he purchased the unit, the appellant had 
signed a Declaration of Co-Ownership, which included a by-law banning 
alteration of the unit’s balcony. According to Iacobucci J., even if it were 
possible for an individual to waive his right to religious freedom, the 
appellant could not be understood to have done so in this case for several 
reasons: first, the waiver was not unconditional (because the prohibition 
was subject to exemptions); second, it was not voluntary (because the 
appellant had no choice but to sign the declaration, if he wanted to reside 
in the building, and because he had not read the by-laws before signing 
them); and third it was not explicit (because it did not make specific 
reference to the affected Charter right).72  
Justice Iacobucci, however, did not decide that an individual could 
never waive his/her freedom of religion. Indeed, I would suggest that in 
Amselem the principal reason the appellant was not bound by his 
undertaking not to alter his balcony was that the condominium association 
had no right to ask for such an undertaking. If the condominium 
association had a duty to accommodate minority religious practices, then 
it could not condition the sale of a unit on agreement by the purchaser 
not to practice his/her religion, or, more specifically, not to erect a 
succah on the unit’s balcony. Any promise to that effect made by the 
purchaser would not be enforceable. But in the absence of a duty to 
accommodate on the part of the promisee, it is unclear why an 
individual, who voluntarily agrees not to perform a particular act, even 
an act that has religious significance for her/him, should not be held to 
her/his promise. According to the courts, an individual’s religious 
practice/belief is valuable because she/he has chosen it, or made a 
personal commitment to it, or because it matters deeply to her/him. A 
particular religious practice has no intrinsic value from a public 
perspective. When an individual undertakes not to perform a practice, 
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others might reasonably assume that she/he is not, or at least not deeply, 
committed to it. Since religion is a personal matter (a matter of 
conscience) others can only rely on the individual’s statements about 
what is important to him/her — about what she thinks she can and 
cannot do without. Moreover, if religious practice is personal, and 
protected as a matter of autonomy or liberty, then an individual should 
be free to decide that she/he does not want or need to perform a 
particular practice, or she/he should be free to bind her/himself 
contractually not to take certain actions. Provided it is given voluntarily, 
his/her undertaking not to perform a certain act is, no less than her/his 
religious commitment, an expression of her/his autonomous judgment.  
In this case, Ms Bruker and Mr. Marcovitz had agreed to release 
each other from their religious marriage. There was no evidence that 
unfair or improper pressure had been brought to bear on Mr. Marcovitz 
to “extract” his promise and so there was no reason not to hold him to it. 
Mr. Marcovitz, by his promise, waived his right to “engage” in the 
particular religious practice or, at least, to exercise the particular power 
granted to him under the rules of his religion. It was not necessary then 
to treat his promise (and the public interest in the enforcement of 
promises) as something that had to be balanced against his freedom of 
religion interest.  
However, the waiver issue is this simple only if Mr. Marcovitz’s 
legal obligation to consent to a religious divorce was based on his 
promise. As noted above, Abella J. did not view the issue so narrowly. In 
her view, Mr. Marcovitz was obligated to give his consent not simply 
because he had given a voluntary undertaking but because public policy 
supported the removal of barriers to religious remarriage. Framed in this 
way, as an issue of public policy, Mr. Marcovitz’s promise to consent is 
an important factor, but only a factor, in the decision that he was legally 
bound to give his consent to a religious divorce.73 
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V. VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATION AND CULTURAL IDENTITY 
The majority judgment of Abella J. held that a contract dealing with 
a religious matter is legally enforceable. But she also held that a promise 
to consent to a religious divorce was enforceable in particular because 
public policy supported the removal of barriers to religious remarriage. 
Indeed, at several points in her judgment, Abella J. seemed to accept that 
even in the absence of a promise to consent, the state might be justified 
(through legislative means) in pressuring or compelling an individual to 
give his consent. She suggested that this policy, whether implemented 
through the (selective) enforcement of promises, or the application of 
pressure under section 21.1 of the Divorce Act, did not breach the 
individual’s freedom of religion, because his religion did not require him 
to withhold his consent. She did not consider that the implementation of 
the policy might be viewed as an interference with the rules and 
practices of the religious community.  
The formal defence of religious freedom, in modern liberal democracies 
such as Canada, emphasizes the value of individual autonomy or liberty 
and the protection of spiritual choices or judgments. In R. v. Big M Drug 
Mart, Dickson C.J.C. stated that the constitutional right to freedom of 
religion protects the individual’s liberty to hold and manifest his/her 
chosen religious beliefs.74 An individual’s religious commitment rests on 
her/his acceptance or assumption that a set of beliefs is true or right 
(even if that truth cannot be finally or fully proved and must to some 
degree be accepted on faith) and that other views are false. It is, 
therefore, potentially revisable, in the face of incompatible scientific 
evidence or moral experience. For the religious adherent, his/her beliefs 
should be respected, because they are true, and not just because she/he 
happens to hold them, or her/his judgment about what is true should be 
respected, because she/he is an autonomous agent. 
Yet, at the same time, religious belief is viewed as a deeply rooted 
part of the individual’s identity that should be treated with equal respect. 
Religion orients the individual in the world, shaping her/his perception 
of the social and natural order and providing a moral framework for 
her/his actions. It represents a significant connection with others — with 
a community of believers. While an individual may be capable of 
reflecting upon, and revising incrementally, particular aspects of her/his 
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world view, it may be difficult or impossible for her/him simply to 
discard and replace his/her most basic values and beliefs or to walk away 
from her/his religious community. 
If religious adherence was simply a personal commitment or choice 
and religious association was purely voluntary, it would be difficult to 
justify state intervention into the affairs of a religious community. 
Respect for individual autonomy or liberty would preclude the state from 
intervening to protect individual members from their adherence to unfair 
laws or rules. An individual, who chooses to become, or remain, a 
member of a particular religious group, may be seen as voluntarily 
submitting to the spiritual laws of that group, or to the group’s authority 
structure. If the individual objects to the group’s norms (the group’s 
interpretation/application of higher law), she/he can decide to withdraw 
from the group and live within the larger community, under state law. 
The state may have a role in ensuring that membership in the religious 
community is truly voluntary, and that members have a genuine right of 
exit, but the state should not otherwise interfere in the internal operation 
of the community.  
Once we recognize that the religious adherent’s identity is tied to 
her/his religious community, then the issue of the “voluntariness” of 
her/his membership becomes more complicated. The individual’s social 
and psychological ties to her/his community are sometimes described as 
barriers to her/his exit, similar to the economic costs that may deter 
her/him from leaving the community. The term “barrier”, though, 
suggests that these ties interfere with the individual’s judgment, prevent 
her/him from making the choices she/he would otherwise make, and, 
like material restrictions, ought to be removed. But no one argues that 
the state can or should nullify these “barriers to exit”. Instead the 
argument is that the state should intervene to protect the individual from 
unjust internal rules because she/he should not have to choose between 
leaving the community to which she/he is deeply connected and 
remaining within the community but subject to its unfair rules. The 
individual’s exit from her/his religious community is difficult for the 
very same reason that community autonomy is important. Exit is 
difficult, and indeed undesirable, precisely because religious community 
plays a central role in the individual member’s life and identity — 
because it is the source of meaning and significance for the individual.  
In this case there were no material barriers to Ms Bruker’s exit from 
the community. She had been granted a civil divorce along with custody 
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of her children and financial support. Like other women affected by the 
unjust divorce rules of Judaism, Ms Bruker chose to remain within the 
community, presumably because this was important to her identity or her 
connection with others. The religious divorce rules affected only Ms 
Bruker’s status within the Jewish community. She was free to remarry 
outside the community but chose not to because she wanted to remain a 
member.  
There may be communities that are so insular, because of factors 
such as location and language, that even if members are “free” to exit, 
they may be unable to imagine other forms of association or other value 
systems. Membership in such a community may be viewed as involuntary 
and state intervention may sometimes be justified to protect the 
individual from unjust rules or to ensure that she/he is exposed to other 
options. Certainly Ms Bruker’s connection to her community was not 
involuntary in this sense. She had not always lived within the 
community and even when she became more closely tied to it, she took a 
selective approach to its rules. Moreover, it appears that the Divorce Act 
amendments were requested by members of the Jewish community 
precisely because the community is no longer insulated from the larger 
society — so that internal pressure on recalcitrant husbands is now far 
less effective.75  
Yet it seems unfair that Ms Bruker must choose between remaining 
within the community subject to its oppressive or discriminatory rules 
and leaving the community to which she feels a deep connection. Should 
the state intervene to protect Ms Bruker from a rule that it regards as 
unfair? State intervention in this case might be seen as supporting her 
religious commitment or association by making life within the 
community more tolerable for her. But is it appropriate for the state to 
decide that a particular religious rule is unfair and dispensable because it 
is inconsistent with public conceptions of equality or freedom? The 
religious community is defined by its rules and practices, even if those 
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rules are sometimes contested. The state is in no position to decide that 
some rules or practices are not essential to the community. While our 
commitment to religious freedom may rest in part on a recognition that 
the individual’s religious commitment is deeply rooted, a part of her/his 
identity, it must also, and finally, rest on a belief that religious adherence 
is a personal commitment — a choice or judgment by the individual — 
that should be respected by the larger community. The freedom protects 
the individual’s right to associate with others, who share a commitment 
to certain values, rules, and practices, and to disassociate if she/he 
disagrees with the religious community’s values and cannot live under 
its rules.  
Because the court is not simply removing a material barrier to exit 
but is instead seeking to limit an internal practice or norm that it regards 
as unjust, it cannot be sure of the effectiveness of its intervention. The 
divorce rules at issue in this case affect the status of individuals within 
the Jewish community, as married, or as adulterous (and in the case of 
children as illegitimate or as non-members). Yet how is the state to 
prevent this sort of internal status harm? In this case state intervention 
may be effective because many in the Jewish community — and not just 
the affected women — are willing to say that indirect state pressure on a 
husband to give a get does not make his “consent” involuntary. 
However, if the religious community (and in particular the religious 
authorities) took the view that any form of state pressure on the husband 
made the get invalid, it is difficult to see what the state could do to 
protect the interests of these women within the community.  
The dissenting judgment’s reluctance to enforce a contract with a 
religious object rests on an assumption that religious values or practices 
are different from other values or concerns, that they are based on faith 
or socialization and lie outside the realm of secular or public reason and 
so cannot be interpreted or applied by secular public institutions. Yet the 
strong position adopted by the dissent against state intervention into the 
affairs of religious communities seemed to be based on the very different 
view that these communities are voluntary associations: “Where religion 
is concerned, the state leaves it to individuals to make their own 
choices”.76 Ms Bruker, said the dissent, is bound by the rules of religious 
divorce only because she has chosen to be or because she wishes to 
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remain within the community. There is nothing to prevent her from 
leaving the faith community, if she objects to its rules and practices.  
Justice Abella, in her majority judgment, was willing to treat the 
husband’s promise as an enforceable voluntary obligation. Yet her 
enforcement decision was significantly based on a public policy 
favouring the removal of barriers to religious remarriage. At a deeper 
level, her decision to enforce the consent promise rested on a recognition 
that membership in a religious community is not simply voluntary and 
that individual members cannot easily exit the community or escape its 
rules. She was enforcing a voluntary obligation made by the husband, 
but she was also acting to mitigate the inequity of the divorce rules of 
Judaism.  
 The issue addressed only obliquely in this case is when, if ever, the 
state is justified in intervening to protect vulnerable group members 
from oppressive or unjust religious rules. A commitment to religious 
freedom involves respecting the individual’s spiritual choices and 
commitments. However, to regard a religious community as an 
association that members join and quit at will, is to miss both the value 
of religious association and its potential to limit and sometimes even to 
oppress its members. 
